Introduction

This book presents the first general theory of the influence of norms on
genocide and mass atrocity. It does so by combining conceptual and empirical arguments. At the conceptual level, the book offers a clear account of
norms and norm transformation, one that is rooted in recent work in moral
and political philosophy, but intended for readers approaching these topics
from a broad range of backgrounds. At the empirical level, the book examines numerous historical cases of large-scale crimes, employing documentary and testimonial sources in order to illustrate the various roles norms
perform before, during, and after such crimes. Ultimately the book argues
that norms—moral, legal, and social—are integral to both the explanation
and the prevention of mass atrocities.
Research on genocide and other kinds of large-scale crimes has long been
the province of empirical social scientists. Historians and psychologists, sociologists and political scientists have all tested their respective disciplinary
methods on the hard problems of mass killing, mass rape, forced removal, and
other forms of mass atrocity.1 More recently, anthropologists, economists,
and scholars of language have added their observations to the expanding literature on such crimes.2 Through this interdisciplinary research program, it
has become possible to regard even the most grievous harms as phenomena
with a long history, a typical etiology, and an internal rationality.
For all the insights offered by contemporary social science, it would be
wrong to conclude that mass atrocities must be viewed merely as empirical
facts. This is because genocide and other large-scale crimes are also matters
of profound normative concern. In studying such crimes, we not only seek
to discover the conditions that make them possible or the causes that make
them actual. We are equally concerned with the wrongs these acts embody,
the punishments they merit, and the interventions they license.
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Philosophy has an important part to play in uniting these empirical
and conceptual strands of inquiry. As a discipline, philosophy has long
assessed the structure and coherence of explanatory theories. It has equally
appraised the soundness of normative claims. By bringing the analytical
tools of philosophy to bear on findings advanced by historians, psychologists, and other social scientists, this book demonstrates the central place of
norms in efforts to explain and constrain mass atrocities.3
I.1 The Notion of Norms
Norms are practical prescriptions, permissions, or prohibitions, accepted
by individuals belonging to particular groups, organizations, or societies,
and capable of guiding the actions of those individuals. Accepting norms
entails adopting various practical commitments and normative attitudes.
These include a commitment to obey the requirements embodied in specific norms, as well as a disposition to disapprove of, and perhaps punish,
fellow group members who fall short of those requirements.
Philosophers frequently distinguish between empirical and normative
notions of norms—between the prescriptions, permissions, and prohibitions that are in fact accepted by individuals, on the one hand, and the
prescriptions, permissions, and prohibitions that individuals ought to
accept, on the other.4 This study focuses on norms in the former, empirical sense. I am concerned chiefly with explaining the power of accepted
norms to guide individuals’ decisions and actions in times of severe social
and political upheaval. Studying the influence of norms under such
straitened conditions serves several aims. It will aid efforts by historians
and other scholars to account for widespread participation by “ordinary”
individuals in atrocities. It will assist policymakers seeking to use norms
to prevent recurrences of large-scale crimes. And it will amend recent
philosophical work on the social and political significance of norms, in
which norms feature chiefly as sources of stability rather than as vectors
for violence.
The urgency of these undertakings stems from the conviction that genocide and mass atrocity are manifestly, even supremely, wrong. Activists and
institutions whose missions start from this conviction regard it as an expression of basic normative truths: such actions are wrong, they deserve opprobrium, they must be prevented. I share these views. But it is not my aim in
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this study to convince readers of the unconscionability of mass atrocities.5
Instead, I advance the less obvious claim that such crimes depend on the
persistence of norms within the groups that perpetrate them and those that
suffer them. Mass atrocities, in other words, typically reflect the presence,
not the absence, of norms.
Vindicating this claim requires that I defend the baseline definition of
norms I just offered. It requires that I draw distinctions among various
kinds of norms—
notably, moral, legal, and social norms—
and contrast
these with other forms of social ordering, such as taboos or conventions.
Finally, it requires that I show how norms can become legitimate objects of
historical and social scientific inquiry. All of these issues will be addressed
in the course of this study. For now, however, another problem demands
attention: the problem of defining mass atrocity.
I.2 The Concept of Mass Atrocity
Raphael Lemkin, the Polish lawyer who coined the term genocide, saw it as
a specific kind of crime, conspicuous for the intention among its perpetrators to destroy not just large numbers of individuals but whole groups.6
The definition embedded in the 1948 UN Convention on the Prevention
and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide narrows this category of criminality still further, singling out a small set of groups as legally recognizable targets of genocide.7 Such definitional restrictions have fueled heated
debates among scholars, jurists, and activists about the essential features
of genocide. They also raise questions about the extent to which genocide
exemplifies mass atrocity.
It might be possible to conduct a study of norms focusing solely on the
crime of genocide. Such a project would face two major hurdles. First, as has
often been noted, genocide presents researchers with a “small-N” problem:
the number (N) of recognized cases is too small to support robust statistical
analyses of the causes and conditions of this crime.8 This problem reflects,
in part, the definitional disputes I mentioned. But it also reflects the fact
that under any plausible definition, genocide seems to occur less frequently
than mass killing, mass rape, and other forms of mass atrocity.
The second challenge for a study focusing solely on genocide is not
statistical but conceptual. Starting with Lemkin, numerous authors have
argued that genocide need not involve any bodily harm, but may at times
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proceed bloodlessly, through the destruction of shared group identities.
Such identities are rooted in part in shared norms. Hence, it is conceivable
that coercively imposed changes to group norms could sometimes constitute
genocide. The difficulties this line of thinking raises are substantial, and
although they should be addressed, I do not seek to do so here.9 Instead,
my focus falls on what Lemkin called “physical genocide,” along with nongenocidal acts of mass killing, mass rape, and forced removal.10
Over the past few decades, various terms have been adopted to refer to
such acts. Two of the most common terms, which I employ throughout this
study, are mass atrocity and large-scale crimes. In order to head off potential
confusions arising from this usage, I must address two issues.
First, both mass atrocity and large-scale crime imply a particular magnitude
of harm. There are two rival approaches to specifying this magnitude. One
approach is quantitative and focuses on the precise number of victims of
such crimes. So in recent years, academics and activists have proposed the
bright-line number of 1,000 civilian deaths occurring over a discrete period
of time as a minimum threshold for mass killings.11 The other approach is
qualitative and focuses on the extent of perpetration as well as on the scale
of suffering. According to this approach, mass atrocities are defined as temporally extended assaults by large numbers of individuals on large numbers
of individuals, where the latter are often further qualified as people particularly vulnerable to harm.12
In this study, I adopt the qualitative approach to the scope of mass atrocity. In my view, the numerical threshold that quantitative scholars now propose is too low to support an inquiry into the influence of norms on mass
atrocities. The killing or maiming of a thousand civilians, though morally
disastrous, may result from the chance detonation of a single explosive or
the misdirected fire of a single infantry unit. It is unreasonable to suppose
that laws, social norms, or moral permissions must be implicated in explanations of such tragedies. It is equally unreasonable to hope that changes
in norms might suffice to prevent them. The qualitative definition, while
still referencing the scope of harm, does not propose an implausibly low
numerical threshold. At the same time, it highlights the widespread nature
of perpetration—something that scholars of mass atrocity have long sought
to understand. Ultimately, this definition provides better access to the acts I
am concerned with, and a better index of the questions I address.13
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Turning to a second potential point of confusion, both mass atrocity and
large-scale crime cast the acts and policies they name as criminal. This is
obvious in the case of large-scale crime. It may be less so in the case of
mass atrocity. The term atrocity, as Mark Osiel has observed, descends from
Roman military law, where it denoted actions deemed unlawful even when
ordered by a duly authorized commander.14 Elsewhere, I have argued that
the set of actions that can be plausibly called atrocities is subject to substantial semantic variation, swelling or shrinking in order to fit political needs.15
I do not wish to downplay the difficulty of identifying legitimate referents
of mass atrocity. But I do reject the claim, sometimes advanced by social
scientists, that it is in principle inappropriate to define genocide, mass
killing, mass rape, and other mass atrocities as crimes.16 To be sure, such
actions have not always been, and are not always now, criminalized. Nor
do legal definitions of such actions align perfectly with popular or scholarly
conceptions—as indicated by the term genocide or by proposed alternatives,
such as atrocity crimes.17 Nevertheless, it is both etymologically accurate and
analytically appropriate to refer to mass atrocities as large-scale crimes.18
I.3 The Enigma of Explanation
In his 2017 study, Why? Explaining the Holocaust, historian Peter Hayes
observes that the adjectives most often employed in public discussions of
the Shoah are unfathomable, incomprehensible, and inexplicable.19 Against
such suggestions of unintelligibility, Hayes arrays the tools developed by
historians, political scientists, and other social scientists for explaining
temporally and geographically extended events. “The Holocaust,” he concludes, “is no less historically explicable than any other human experience,
though the job is not easy.”20
Philosophers and other readers encountering this claim may wish to
know precisely what types of explanations are on offer. Whereas the explanations of physical events and processes supplied by natural scientists tend
to be nomological—that is, grounded in appeals to general causal laws—
social scientific explanations of large-scale crimes display a different structure. Historians and other scholars of mass atrocity do not typically seek to
show that particular mass killings, forced removals, or other crimes had to
occur precisely when they did, where they did, and how they did. Rather,
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they aim to identify social and political factors that allow attacks to proceed
against certain populations and to distinguish psychological factors underlying individual participation in atrocities. The most common way of framing such explanations is to speak of factors that promote the occurrence of
mass atrocities, on the one hand, and factors that constrain atrocities, on
the other.21
One problem with this approach is that it can be difficult to determine
which particular factors are most relevant in any given case. Consider the
following list of factors scholars have cited in order to explain the fact
that men, rather than women, predominate among perpetrators of mass
atrocities:
1. The different susceptibility of men and women to peer pressure22
2. “Entrenched gender norms and expectations” that frequently restrict
women’s “opportunities to perpetrate harm”23
3. Colonial-era policies of forced labor (corvée) applied solely to male subjects24
4. Traditional associations between masculinity and military service25
5. The preponderance of “bored young men” in refugee camps26
In some cases of large-scale crimes, we can exclude one or more of these
factors as inapplicable. But in most cases multiple factors retain at least a
prima facie claim to relevance.
I do not hope to dissolve this general concern about the structure of
social scientific explanations of mass atrocity. Instead, my aim is to eliminate some particular confusions arising from inadequate conceptual
approaches to norms within existing explanatory theories. Historians and
social scientists regularly refer to moral and social norms in their accounts
of perpetration, victimization, and resistance, but they rarely state clearly
how they understand those different types of norms or display a firm grasp
of the distinctions between them. Legal scholars have strenuously debated
the abstract question of whether legality is compatible with mass atrocity,
but they have largely ignored the more mundane ways in which legal norms
can help explain large-scale crimes. Finally, scholars of genocide often issue
sweeping claims about the absence or inversion of norms during historical
episodes of this crime, without recognizing that in many places, their own
sources refute those claims. Exposing these problems and proposing alternative ways of integrating moral, legal, and social norms into explanatory
accounts of mass atrocity is one major goal of this book.
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I.4 The Problem of Prevention
Since the end of the Cold War, international institutions and individual
nations have devoted considerable resources to the prevention of mass
atrocities. Over the same period, scholars of large-scale crimes have clarified the notion of prevention itself. They have distinguished “proximate”
and “structural” approaches to preventing mass atrocities.27 They have contrasted “early-warning systems” with “risk-assessment” initiatives.28 At the
most basic level, researchers have shown that the forward-looking task of
preventing mass atrocities differs substantially from the backward-looking
task of explaining them.29
Not all strategies for preventing large-
scale crimes implicate norms
directly. Military approaches to atrocity prevention emphasize the power
of armed soldiers to forcibly counter specific episodes of mass killing, mass
rape, or forced removal.30 Proposals focusing on education or economic
opportunities tend to treat norms simply as vehicles for distributing social
goods.31 Finally, some scholars suggest that the causes of mass atrocities are
so various, and the motives of perpetrators so diverse, that no effort at prevention that centers on specific moral, legal, or social norms can succeed.32
In arguing that norms are integral to the prevention, as well as the
explanation, of large-scale crimes, I do not take myself to be denying the
complexity of such crimes; rather, I am affirming it. When humanitarian
aid workers question the traditional rules that prescribe neutrality during ongoing conflicts, they are asking whether fundamental moral norms
require them to make a more explicit stand against atrocities. When lawyers
at domestic or international tribunals prioritize prosecutions for high-level
officials, their decisions reflect beliefs about how the enforcement of legal
norms can help deter large-scale crimes. Finally, when schools adopt curricula that teach students to be “upstanders” (that is, to intervene against
harms directed at third parties), they embrace the idea that social norms
structure both everyday acts of bullying and extraordinary outbreaks of
violence.
We must look to empirical research to determine what evidence supports
the preventive effects claimed in each of these cases. In some areas, such as
the study of bystanding, empirical inquiries are well established, but conclusions concerning preventive power remain equivocal. In other areas,
such as investigations of the deterrent power of international criminal
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trials, only preliminary assessments are possible. One aim of this book is to
establish a shared conceptual framework for scholars interested in the preventive power of moral, legal, and social norms. Another aim is to distinguish short-term, medium-term, and long-term contributions that norms
can make to this end.
I.5 The Argument of This Book
Three main claims make up my argument in this book. The first is that
genocide and other kinds of mass atrocity are social processes, reflecting
larger social structures. The second claim is that historical cases of mass
atrocity typically reflect the presence, rather than the absence, of norms.
The third claim is that norms are crucial to both the explanation and the
prevention of large-scale crimes.
Each of these claims cuts against common views of the causes and characteristics of mass atrocities. Studies of genocide often hypothesize the collapse of morality or the failure of legality as preconditions for violent group
destruction. Some of the weightiest literary reflections on the Holocaust go
further, suggesting that the very possibility of linking causes to effects broke
down within the confines of Nazi concentration camps.33
Besides the belief that genocide entails the absence or progressive disappearance of norms, there is another view of large-scale crimes that my
argument contests. This is the view that such crimes generally proceed
from decisions taken by state leaders in response to the requirements of
instrumental rationality. This explanation of mass atrocity takes different
forms in different contexts. In contexts of war, especially international
armed conflicts, the decisions that military commanders or state leaders
take to bomb, starve, or displace civilians may be said to reflect Kriegsraison,
or hard-headed calculations of military necessity.34 In contexts of domestic upheaval, the decision to torture or abduct citizens en masse may be
said to reflect a dominant strategy of “draining the sea.”35 Implicit in such
accounts is the idea that norms, or at least norms that go beyond the bare
requirements of instrumental rationality, have no place in explanations of
mass atrocities.
I believe both of these approaches to explaining large-scale crimes fail,
and for the same reason: both proceed from a desire for simplicity in explaining events that appear to defy comprehension. To those who fear that
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large-scale crimes are unintelligible, the theorist of norm collapse responds
that such attacks are just what we should expect when all accustomed limits on human conduct vanish. To those who claim that mass atrocities are
incomprehensible, the instrumentalist responds that these crimes reflect the
same calculations that spur the dredging of harbors or the enforcement of
quarantines. It is commendable to offer an explanation where none appears
forthcoming. But not all explanations fit the features, including the normative features, of the events in question. The view of mass atrocity defended
in this study surpasses accounts based on norm collapse or instrumental
calculation. To show why, I must unpack my main claims.
First, I claim that mass atrocities are social processes, reflecting larger
social structures. To be a social process means to draw on the sorts of institutions, resources, and relationships that make any substantial human
undertaking possible.36 To reflect larger social structures means to use those
institutions, resources, and relationships in ways that do not radically break
with, but instead extend, prior social arrangements. When soldiers or police
kidnap civilians or torture dissidents, their actions reflect capacities that
also make possible the legitimate functions of armies and police forces.
When the men in a community join together to kill or displace their neighbors while their wives plunder those neighbors’ homes, a preexisting gendered division of labor directs the progress of violence. While I do not go
so far as to say that mass atrocities are normal outgrowths of modern social
arrangements, I do think that all existing societies have features that make
such crimes possible and affect their course when they occur.37
Second, I claim that historical cases of mass atrocity typically reflect the
presence, rather than the absence, of norms. Identifying the existence of
norms “in the wild” presents serious methodological challenges.38 Undertaking this task for historical cases of mass atrocity compounds the difficulty. Nevertheless, basic assumptions about the nature of human agency,
combined with the testimony of those who have lived through, suffered
from, or perpetrated large-scale crimes, give us reason to investigate the
influence of norms on such crimes. By reviewing a wide range of historical
cases and focusing on salient distinctions among moral, legal, and social
norms, I hope to show how norms help guide the actions of perpetrators,
targets, and resisters of mass atrocities.
Third, I claim that norms are crucial to both the explanation and the
prevention of large-scale crimes. I have already observed that the tasks of
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explanation and prevention differ in important ways. Much of the discussion
in the chapters that follow is devoted to drawing out those differences. Here
it may suffice to say that I believe explanations of genocide and mass atrocity
must consider the conduct of individual agents, highly organized institutions, and loosely unorganized collectives—and that efforts to prevent large-
scale crimes must also address each of these different levels of social reality.
I.6 Sources and Methods
Philosophers have long consulted historical cases in order to test key conceptual and normative claims. This is especially true of those philosophical
subfields that focus on issues of war and peace. My strategy in this study
goes beyond established philosophical uses of history insofar as I give sustained attention to primary, as well as secondary, sources. In light of this, I
shall briefly describe these sources, their value, and their limits.
Letters and diaries, reports and memoranda are the main primary sources
I use in this book. Such materials have the advantage of being contemporaneous with the crimes they describe. In addition to these documentary sources, my argument draws on oral testimony offered in courtrooms,
classrooms, and recording studios by survivors, witnesses, and perpetrators
of atrocities. Though not contemporary with events, such testimony conveys key details about the kinds of harm involved in large-scale crimes and
about the normative beliefs and attitudes of their subjects. As will become
clear in the chapters that follow, I am especially interested in using these
sources to spotlight moments in which historical actors reflect on relevant
norms; embrace particular legal, moral, or social norms as guides to action;
or else reject their authority.39
The use of primary sources poses challenges well known to historians
but less familiar to philosophers. Questions of authenticity cloud some
documents; barriers to access at relevant archives prevent researchers from
consulting others. Many primary sources that scholars of mass atrocity
employ derive from documents compiled or testimonies recorded during
specific legal proceedings, such as the International Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda or the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg. The standards
of evidence used in these proceedings were not identical, and they often
differed substantially from the standards that historians and other scholars accept.40 Finally, in the case of oral histories in particular, problems of
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memory, motivation, and context must be considered when assessing the
credibility of each individual witness to atrocity.41
While primary sources are invaluable for exhibiting the historical operation of norms, this study draws more heavily on the large body of secondary
scholarship on genocide and other kinds of mass atrocities. Beginning in
the immediate post-Holocaust period, when scholars like Raphael Lemkin
and Raul Hilberg drafted the first major studies, the crime of genocide has
been analyzed from an enormous range of perspectives. Important work has
also been done on the related crimes of mass killing, mass rape, and forced
removal.42 This literature conveys essential details about the historical examples discussed in this study, ranging from the concentration camps erected in
South Africa at the start of the twentieth century, through the mid-century
horrors of fascism and communism, up to the atrocities observed in postcolonial societies in recent decades. At the same time, this secondary literature
provides a crucial starting point for the theoretical interventions I undertake.
Specifically, I argue that the action-
guiding power of norms, though
assumed in most studies of genocide and mass atrocity, is rarely analyzed
explicitly, and never with sufficient clarity. Few scholars draw clear distinctions among moral, legal, and social norms or recognize the different ways in
which these several kinds of norms influence action before, during, and after
large-scale crimes. Many scholars assert that mass atrocities proceed from
inversions of moral norms, or breakdowns in legal norms, without providing
proof of these dynamics. Across the various chapters of this study, I develop
a more principled framework for integrating norms into the study of mass
atrocity.
The account of norms I defend is grounded in the scholarship of numerous philosophers and political theorists. Comprehensive studies of norms
by Robert Goodin, Geoffrey Brennan, Nicholas Southwood, and Lina Eriksson, as well as work done specifically on social norms by Cristina Bicchieri,
form the backbone of my discussion. In addition, investigations of legality rooted in the mid-century work of H. L. A. Hart and Lon Fuller have
informed my account of legal norms, and philosophical studies of failures
of professional ethics during historical mass atrocities by Berel Lang and
Jonathan Glover have aided my discussion of moral norms. Turning to a different disciplinary tradition, the work of constructivists in the field of international relations, including such leading theorists as Martha Finnemore,
Kathryn Sikkink, and Alex Bellamy, has enriched my understanding of how
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norms function in international politics. Studies of specific norms by Tuba
Inal, Phil Orchard, Richard Price, and Karisa Cloward underpin my arguments about the constraining power of legal norms. Finally, the work of
philosophers and legal scholars such as Ruti Teitel, Colleen Murphy, and
Larry May on transitional justice has been critical to my understanding of
the aftermath of large-scale crimes. Strengthening the connections among
these various branches of scholarship is an important secondary aim of this
study, as will be seen in my chapter summaries.
I.7 Chapter Summaries
Chapter 1 sets out the basic theory of norms employed in this study and
addresses some fundamental questions about the power of norms to explain
and constrain large-scale crimes. I first distinguish my conception of norms
from mere statistical regularities or behavioral patterns, focusing instead on
agents’ practical commitments and normative attitudes. Next, I describe
my strategy for differentiating moral, legal, and social norms on the basis
of salient distinctions in the ways such norms appear within the practical
point of view. Briefly, I argue that (1) moral norms are not grounded in
real or perceived social practices and are not subject to standing procedural
rules governing their creation, modification, or elimination, whereas
(2) legal norms are grounded in real or perceived social practices and are
subject to standing procedural rules governing their creation, modification,
or elimination, while (3) social norms are grounded in real or perceived
social practices but are not subject to standing procedural rules governing
their creation, modification, or elimination. These distinctions, discussed
in more depth below, are schematically represented in table I.1.
Turning to the substantive aims of this study, the second half of chapter
1 defends three assumptions underlying any effort to exhibit the influence
of norms on large-scale crimes. The first is that it is possible reliably to identify differences in the norms accepted by individuals across two or more
places or moments in time. The second is that norms have a nonreducible power to guide the actions of individuals and pattern the conduct of
groups. The third is that it is possible to pinpoint specific mechanisms by
which changes in norms have been, or might be, achieved.
Chapter 2 shows how moral norms help explain genocide and mass
atrocity. Moral norms, I argue, are distinguished from legal and social norms
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Table I.1
Salient Distinctions among Moral, Legal, and Social Norms

Moral norms
Legal norms
Social norms

Practice Grounded

Governed by Standing Procedural Rules

No
Yes
Yes

No
Yes
No

by their independence from real or perceived social practices, combined
with the absence of standing procedural rules governing their emergence,
modification, or elimination. The chapter first examines the widespread
scholarly view that mass atrocities proceed from an inversion of preexisting
moral norms among perpetrators. Against this thesis, I argue that processes
of norm evasion and norm erosion are more useful for explaining most cases
of individual participation in large-scale crimes. I illustrate my account of
the erosion of moral norms by discussing historical cases of demoralization
and brutalization before and during mass atrocity. I illustrate my account of
the evasion of moral norms by considering how techniques of euphemism
and dehumanization obscure the immorality of such crimes. In the final
section of the chapter, I consider whether professional complicity in mass
atrocities provides conclusive evidence of inversions in moral norms.
Chapter 3 assesses how moral norms assist in preventing large-
scale
crimes. I begin by describing a special class of moral norms against deliberation, or norms that morally prohibit even thinking about performing
certain actions or calculating the costs of doing so. I next consider the significance of moral norms against deliberation for individuals specially trained
to perform violent acts: soldiers serving in regular armies or irregular armed
groups. After describing traditional just war principles that aim to shape
the deliberative agenda for soldiers and commanders considering various
courses of conduct in war, I introduce alternative principles proposed by
so-called revisionist just war theorists and show that these proposals stem
largely from a concern to prevent mass atrocities. In the second part of the
chapter, I turn to another set of agents active on the front lines of large-
scale crimes: humanitarian aid workers. Reviewing recent debates about
the adequacy of the traditional humanitarian principles of impartiality and
neutrality, I show that these debates equally reflect a concern for atrocity prevention. The chapter concludes by critically evaluating philosopher
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Jonathan Glover’s account of the moral resources that might empower ordinary citizens to take an active part in preventing mass atrocities.
Chapter 4 examines the power of legal norms to help explain large-scale
crimes. Legal norms are distinguished from moral and social norms by their
grounding in real or perceived social practices, combined with the existence of standing procedural rules governing their emergence, modification,
or elimination. One long-running debate within Anglo-American jurisprudence concerns the question of whether the rule of law can be upheld even
during mass atrocities. While such debates usually focus on the validity of
legal norms in contexts where mass atrocities occur, I argue that we should
consider the broader range of roles that legal norms play in the etiology of
large-scale crimes. Legal norms contribute to the creation of invidious social
categories; the progressive marginalization and persecution of persons placed
in those categories; the restriction of information concerning such marginalization and persecution; and the closure of escape routes that might otherwise provide a final refuge from mass atrocity. In light of their contributions
to such social transformations, I conclude that legal norms play a crucial role
in creating conditions for large-scale crimes. At the same time, these norms
provide a privileged source of evidence for scholars of mass atrocities.
Chapter 5 addresses the value of legal norms as constraints on mass
atrocities. I first briefly survey the many laws and legal institutions developed during the twentieth century in response to large-scale crimes. Here I
distinguish efforts aimed at preventing such crimes from occurring in the
first place from efforts designed to save victims or deter perpetrators once
those crimes are underway. Next, I consider the argument that legalization,
that is, the development of legal norms that are highly precise, obligatory,
and delegated, is necessary for law to effectively constrain mass atrocities. While this argument is plausible for societies that are not currently
threatened by large-scale crimes, it fails to capture the needs of societies
undergoing transitions in the wake of such crimes. Building on Colleen
Murphy’s recent study of such societies, and particularly her analysis of the
circumstances of transitional justice, I show that these circumstances commonly require departures from the precision, obligation, and delegation of
relevant laws. Rather than reflecting an unwillingness to use law to prevent
mass atrocities, such departures may be defended precisely in these terms.
Chapter 6 introduces the third major category of norms considered
in this study, namely, social norms. Social norms are distinguished from
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legal and moral norms by their grounding in real or perceived social practices, combined with the absence of standing procedural rules governing
their emergence, modification, or elimination. Such norms, I argue, contribute to large-scale crimes in two fundamentally different ways. On the
one hand, preexisting social norms within particular groups or societies
often influence atrocities from the moment they begin. On the other hand,
novel social norms may arise once atrocities are underway, structuring subsequent patterns of perpetration, victimization, and resistance. My discussion in this chapter focuses on the first of these pathways. I am particularly
concerned with exploring the role of preexisting social norms in creating
and sustaining gender-based patterns of violence during large-scale crimes.
Preexisting gender norms do much to explain the profiles of perpetrators
during large-scale crimes, as I argue. They also help determine the specific
types of harms that targeted individuals and groups suffer and the strategies
for escape that they pursue.
Chapter 7 explores the power of social norms to help prevent mass
atrocities. The chapter begins by rebutting a common misconception about
rescuers during atrocities, according to which such individuals are comparatively insensitive to social norms. While social norms in fact play an
important part in guiding rescuers’ decisions and actions, I argue that rescue is of limited significance for thinking about atrocity prevention. Next,
I examine how the elimination of existing social norms within particular
populations can help constrain large-scale crimes. Focusing on three kinds
of social norms prescribing silence about past or ongoing atrocities, I distinguish three means by which these “bad” norms can be disrupted. Finally, I
turn to consider how the intentional creation of new social norms can help
prevent mass atrocities. My discussion centers on the example of social
norms prohibiting incitement to atrocities. These norms avoid many of the
objections that legal prohibitions on this form of expression commonly
encounter. At the same time, a social norm against incitement might spread
more rapidly within particular societies through the influence of norm
leaders. The chapter concludes by considering the future prospects of social
norms as tools for atrocity prevention and by restating the need to unite
moral, legal, and social norms in this cause.
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